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“[W]e are not inclined to carve out an approach to administrative
1
review good for tax only.”
“[T]he standard doctrines of administrative law . . . should not be
2
taken too rigidly.”

INTRODUCTION
“Tax exceptionalism” holds that, like the animals of an island
long cut off from a continent, the administrative law of tax has
evolved into different forms than those found in general
administrative law. Critics of tax exceptionalism take a dim view of
this diversity, contending that general principles of administrative law
should apply in the tax context just as they do in other contexts. This
approach’s virtues include simplicity, elegance, and commitment to
the rule-of-law concept that the law should be the same everywhere
and for everyone. It runs the risk, however, of downplaying the
virtues of pragmatism, flexibility, and realism. An objective look at
the evolution of administrative law in the United States indicates that
it is, and will likely forever remain, a muddled mess in important
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1. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704, 713 (2011).
2. Wos v. E.M.A. ex rel. Johnson, 133 S. Ct. 1391, 1403 (2013) (Breyer, J., concurring)
(quoting Louis Jaffe, Administrative Law: Burden of Proof and Scope of Review, 79 HARV. L.
REV. 914, 918 (1966)).
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respects. This Essay’s simple contention is that courts and other
commentators should give due weight to the history and virtues of
this mess—and consider embracing the pragmatism and flexibility
that it enables—before killing off more mutations from the island of
misfit tax administrative law doctrines.
Two of the most prominent examples of tax exceptionalism
implicate the authority of the Treasury Department (Treasury) to
promulgate “general authority” regulations pursuant to 26
U.S.C. § 7805(a), which authorizes Treasury to “prescribe all needful
rules and regulations for the enforcement” of the Internal Revenue
Code (IRC). Controversy has existed regarding whether Treasury’s
general authority regulations may be eligible for Chevron deference,
which requires courts to defer to an agency’s reasonable
3
interpretation of a statute that it administers. Also, until recently,
Treasury had long maintained that its general authority regulations
were categorically “interpretative,” and therefore did not require
notice-and-comment procedures under the Administrative Procedure
4
Act (APA). Scholars, led by Professor Kristin Hickman, have made
5
powerful arguments to the contrary. Notably, both the Chevron gap
and the notice-and-comment gap implicate one of the most slippery
and confusing phrases in administrative law—the “force of law.”
Chevron deference applies to agency statutory constructions that
carry the force of law, and agencies are generally supposed to use the
notice-and-comment process to promulgate legislative rules carrying
the force of law.
In 2011, the Supreme Court put an end to the Chevron gap by
holding in Mayo Foundation for Medical Education & Research v.
6
United States that Chevron deference does indeed apply to certain
general authority Treasury regulations—which therefore must possess

3. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 839–40 (1984).
For a discussion of the evolution of the Chevron doctrine, see infra Part I.
4. See Kristin E. Hickman, Unpacking the Force of Law, 66 VAND. L. REV. 465, 495
(2013) (observing that Treasury has long taken the view that rules promulgated pursuant to its
general authority are interpretative rules); id. (noting that the Internal Revenue Service recently
“has amended the Internal Revenue Manual (“IRM”) to acknowledge that at least some
general authority regulations may be legislative rules”); id. (noting that notwithstanding this
amendment, Treasury continues to assert that notice-and-comment procedures are not required
for general authority rulemaking).
5. See generally Kristin E. Hickman, Coloring Outside the Lines: Examining Treasury’s
(Lack of) Compliance with Administrative Procedure Act Rulemaking Requirements, 82 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1727 (2007).
6. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. and Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704 (2011).

MURPHY IN PP 2 (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

PRAGMATIC ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

10/23/2014 5:17 PM

23

7

the force of law. This closing of the Chevron gap might suggest a
speedy end to the notice-and-comment gap, too. The argument might
run as follows: Mayo establishes that at least some general authority
regulations carry the force of law; interpretative rules do not carry the
force of law; and Treasury must therefore have been wrong to claim
that its general authority rules are categorically interpretative rather
than legislative. It should follow that Treasury should, contrary to its
longstanding practice, use notice-and-comment procedures to issue at
8
least those general authority regulations that carry the force of law.
In short, it is tempting to read Mayo as a sign that Treasury has badly
misunderstood the APA’s rulemaking requirements for many
decades and had better start using notice-and-comment procedures
for at least some of its general authority rules.
This Essay does not defend its own definitive resolution to the
notice-and-comment gap; instead, it proposes an attitude. As courts
assess an important administrative practice that is many decades old,
they should be at once pragmatic and conservative. The consequences
of aggressive application of notice-and-comment requirements to
Treasury’s general authority rules could be substantial and
9
unfortunate. Due respect for both historical practice and the law of
unintended consequences suggests that courts should, if they properly
can, avoid such a result. Of course, courts cannot ignore clear law
even if it has unfortunate policy consequences. The pertinent
administrative law does not, however, seem so clear as to exclude
room for courts to shape and implement this law in a pragmatic spirit
that cares about consequences.
This Essay proceeds in two parts. Part I sets the stage for further
discussion by examining the Supreme Court’s recent fix of the
Chevron gap in Mayo. Two lessons emerge from this examination.
First, the Chevron doctrine, on brief inspection, provides an excellent
7. Id. at 713 (citation omitted).
8. See Hickman, supra note 4, at 468 (noting this tension).
9. See generally Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Which Institution Should Determine Whether an
Agency’s Explanation of a Tax Decision is Adequate?: A Response to Steve Johnson, 64 DUKE
L.J. ONLINE 1, 12 (2014) (describing the consequences of forcing Treasury to use modern
notice-and-comment as “devastating”). Later in his essay, Professor Pierce explains that judicial
enforcement of statutory bars on pre-enforcement review of tax rules could mitigate this
damage. Id. at 16–18. Even if courts applied these statutory bars to full effect, however,
Treasury would have to expect judicial review of its rules as a defense in enforcement actions.
As such, the unavailability of pre-enforcement review might do little to reduce the upfront
investment that Treasury would need to make as it promulgates rules through notice-andcomment.
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demonstration of the courts’ flexible approach to the APA—which
they sometimes “interpret” with marvelous aggression, and
sometimes ignore. Second, viewed from one angle, Mayo represents a
formalist impulse to simplify deference doctrine with a one-size-fitsall approach. Viewed from another, broader angle, however, Mayo is
consistent with administrative law’s pragmatic impulses—it fixes an
unnecessary doctrinal complication at a very cheap price. In Part II,
the focus turns to the notice-and-comment gap. Here, again, we see
strong evidence of judicial creativity regarding administrative law.
Courts have essentially rewritten the APA’s notice-and-comment
provisions, transforming them from an easy and straightforward
mechanism in 1946 into their current monstrous form. Aggressive
application to Treasury of notice-and-comment rulemaking à la 2014
could prove very costly. Moreover, a decision to do so would
necessarily turn on administrative law’s famously murky attempts to
draw the line between “interpretative” and “legislative” rules. Given
the law’s lack of clarity, the potential costs of fixing the notice-andcomment gap, and the courts’ integral role in creating these costs,
courts should, at the least, give Treasury the benefit of any doubt on
the issue of whether its general authority regulations are
“interpretative”—even if it takes quite a bit of interpretative effort by
the courts to do so.
I. IGNORING THE APA, CHEVRON DEFERENCE,
AND MAYO’S CHEAP FIX
Section 706(2) of the APA instructs reviewing courts that they
shall:
hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions
found to be—
...
(B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity;
(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or
short of statutory right;
10

(D) without observance of procedure required by law . . . .

A naïve reader might be forgiven for thinking that this provision
makes plain that courts, not agencies, are to determine issues of law
10. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (2012).
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embedded in agency actions. This straightforward reading of the
APA is consistent with centuries of judicial declarations of
11
interpretative supremacy, Marbury v. Madison foremost among
them, to the effect that “[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of
12
the judicial department to say what the law is.”
This reading is also consistent, however, with centuries of
sensible judicial declarations that courts should defer to reasonable
13
agency statutory interpretations. These two ideas do not need to
contradict. The courts can be in charge of determining statutory
meaning but, as they do so, can also choose to give substantial weight
to an agency’s statutory interpretation as a source of helpful
information. Often, courts have justified deference based on agency
expertise. For instance, courts have stated that deference to agency
statutory constructions devised near the time of a statute’s adoption
may be proper because the agency officials possess valuable
information regarding legislative intent—they may even have helped
14
draft the language at issue. Other justifications have related to
systemic concerns about protecting legal stability and reliance
interests. Thus, longstanding, consistent agency statutory
constructions have been entitled to great weight and should not be
15
“overturned except for cogent reasons.”
Over time, various forms of judicial deference have come to be
associated with the names of influential cases. Skidmore v. Swift &
16
Co., which was decided in 1944 just two years before the APA’s
17
adoption, has provided a particularly durable moniker. Regarding
judicial review of agency statutory constructions, Justice Jackson
famously advised in Skidmore that
[w]e consider that the rulings, interpretations and opinions of
the Administrator under this Act, while not controlling upon the
courts by reason of their authority, do constitute a body of
experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may

11. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
12. Id. at 177.
13. See, e.g., United States v. Vowell, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 368, 372 (1810) (“If the question
had been doubtful, the court would have respected the uniform construction which it is
understood has been given by the treasury department of the United States upon similar
questions.”).
14. United States v. Moore, 95 U.S. 760, 763 (1877).
15. United States v. Chi., N. Shore & Milwaukee R.R. Co., 288 U.S. 1, 13 (1933).
16. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
17. Id. at 134.
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properly resort for guidance. The weight of such a judgment in a
particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its
consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with
earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it
18
power to persuade, if lacking power to control.

In the parlance of general administrative law, “Skidmore deference”
or, equivalently, “Skidmore respect,” thus stands for the idea that
courts should pay attention to an agency’s construction of a statute
that it administers, giving the agency’s analysis whatever weight it
reasonably deserves.
In the field of tax, a similar idea has applied but gone by another
case name. In 1979, just five years before Chevron, the Court decided
19
National Muffler Dealers Ass’n v. United States. In it, the Court
offered the following guide for review:
A regulation may have particular force if it is a substantially
contemporaneous construction of the statute by those presumed to
have been aware of congressional intent. If the regulation dates
from a later period, the manner in which it evolved merits inquiry.
Other relevant considerations are the length of time the regulation
has been in effect, the reliance placed on it, the consistency of the
Commissioner’s interpretation, and the degree of scrutiny Congress
has devoted to the regulation during subsequent re-enactments of
20
the statute.

“National Muffler deference” thus combines, among other threads:
(a) the traditional idea that a statutory construction adopted shortly
after the enactment of the underlying statute merits special weight,
and (b) concepts from Skidmore deference.
In 1984, the Court unleashed Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural
21
Resources Defense Council, Inc. Its two-step test commands courts
reviewing an agency’s construction of a statute it administers to check
whether Congress has spoken directly to the precise issue in question
and, if Congress has not, to affirm the agency’s construction so long as
22
it is “permissible”—i.e., reasonable. The Court gave two different
types of explanation for this deference—one rooted in authority and
the other in competence. First, it declared that ambiguous language in
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Id. at 140.
Nat’l Muffler Dealers Ass’n v. United States 440 U.S. 472, 477 (1979).
Id. at 477 (citation omitted).
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
Id. at 842–43 (1984).
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an agency’s enabling act signals an implicit delegation by Congress of
23
agency authority to resolve it. Second, the Court noted that it makes
sense for courts to defer to reasonable agency statutory constructions
because agencies have greater policy expertise and political
24
accountability than courts.
By relying on an implicit delegation premise, Chevron purported
to shift responsibility for judicial deference from the courts to
Congress. In other words, courts must apply rationality review
because Congress told them to do so (though not out loud), rather
than because the courts themselves have concluded that it would be a
good idea to defer to an expert agency. Viewed from this angle, one
might say that Chevron imputes to Congress an implicit intent to
amend the APA’s instruction in § 706(2) that courts should determine
issues of law. This characterization is problematic for at least two
reasons. First, at no point in the Chevron decision did the Court
25
discuss or even cite the APA. Second, the APA itself instructs courts
that they should refrain from holding that a later statute has amended
26
the APA unless the later statute does so expressly.
Empirical investigation suggests that the Court’s flexible and
creative approach to judicial deference doctrines, though catnip for
administrative-law scholars, may not actually affect case outcomes
very often. Courts affirm agencies at similar rates regardless of
27
whether they purport to apply Skidmore or Chevron deference. Still,
Chevron has been regarded in many quarters as very strong
medicine—stripping from courts their Marbury power to declare
definitive interpretations of law and ceding it to agencies.
Accordingly, the Court has devised a set of threshold tests for
determining which agency statutory constructions deserve Chevron
28
deference. Commentators christened these inquiries “Step Zero.”

23. Id. at 844.
24. Id. at 865–66.
25. Cf. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 241 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting
“[t]here is some question whether Chevron was faithful to the text of the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA), which it did not even bother to cite”).
26. 5 U.S.C. § 559 (2012).
27. See David Zaring, Reasonable Agencies, 96 VA. L. REV. 135, 173–76 (2010)
(summarizing empirical studies showing that the ostensible standard of review does not seem to
affect agency affirmance rates on judicial review to any great degree).
28. See, e.g., Cass Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 190–91 (2006).
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The lead Step Zero case is United States v. Mead Corp., which
strongly reiterated that Chevron deference turns on congressional
intent. It declared that Chevron should apply “when it appears that
Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules
carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming
30
deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority.” A year
31
later, however, in Barnhart v. Walton, the Court explained that the
applicability of Chevron should turn on factors including “the
interstitial nature of the legal question, the related expertise of the
Agency, the importance of the question to administration of the
statute, the complexity of that administration, and the careful
consideration the Agency has given the question over a long period of
32
time.” Thus, the true test for applying Chevron is whether, under all
the relevant circumstances, the Court thinks it would be a good idea
to do so. As many have recognized, the implicit delegation of
33
Chevron is an obvious fiction.
In Mayo, the Court confronted the issue of whether National
Muffler deference—a cousin of Skidmore—or the Chevron
framework should apply to a regulation that Treasury had adopted
pursuant to its general authority but after the notice-and-comment
34
process. The Court made short work of abandoning National
Muffler, noting that it was “not inclined to carve out an approach to
35
administrative review good for tax law only.” Applying Chevron’s
Step Zero, the Court concluded that Congress had delegated
authority to Treasury to imbue its statutory constructions with the
force of law, and Treasury had invoked this authority by using notice36
and-comment procedures to issue the rule in question. Chevron
deference therefore applied to the statutory interpretation embedded
in the rule.

29. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
30. Id. at 226–27.
31. Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212 (2002).
32. Id. at 222.
33. See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2379 (2001)
(characterizing the implicit delegation underlying Chevron deference as a “fictional
presumption”); Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law,
1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 517 (1989) (characterizing Chevron deference as based on a “fictional,
presumed intent”).
34. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704, 713 (2011).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 713–14.
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The Court’s decision to abandon National Muffler in favor of
Chevron was eminently sensible. Judicial review doctrines are
needlessly complex, and they do not seem to influence case outcomes
much. The Court might as well simplify the law of scope of review by
abandoning doctrinal variations as long as the costs do not seem high.
Here, the Mayo fix was cheap and easy. Applying the Chevron
framework rather than National Muffler to Treasury’s general
authority regulations will likely change nothing in the real world
other than simplifying brief and opinion writing. Of course, this cheap
and easy fix also expanded, a little, the long Chevron tradition of
ignoring the APA.
II. COURTS SHOULD THINK HARD BEFORE IMPOSING A COSTLY
FIX FOR THE NOTICE-AND-COMMENT GAP
Mayo establishes that the Chevron framework applies to
Treasury’s general authority regulations just as it applies in other
contexts of administrative law. This conclusion might in turn suggest a
broader “no exceptions” approach to the applicability of doctrines of
general administrative law. Following this approach, the general
principles governing when an agency should have to use notice-andcomment procedures to promulgate a rule should apply without
change to Treasury. That Mayo rested on a determination that
general authority regulations can carry the force of law strengthens
this argument insofar as regulations that carry the force of law
generally require notice-and-comment procedures.
Courts should nonetheless think long and hard before
aggressively applying notice-and-comment requirements to
Treasury’s general authority rules without adjusting to their special
context. As discussed below, whereas closing the Chevron gap was
very cheap, closing the notice-and-comment gap could prove quite
costly. Moreover, the primary reason for this cost is that the courts,
through extremely creative construction of the APA, have made
notice-and-comment procedures very expensive. Worsening matters,
these same courts have never been able to devise a clear test for
determining which rules require notice-and-comment and which do
not. It might therefore behoove courts to apply the creativity and
flexibility that they have applied in other contexts of administrative
law to avoid imposing dubious procedural burdens on Treasury’s
efforts to implement our magnificently complex tax code.
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A. The Judicial Rewrite of Notice-and-Comment Rulemaking
Perhaps the best example of the courts’ creative approach to
fashioning modern administrative law is their rewrite of the APA’s
notice-and-comment procedures. In 1946, the APA contemplated a
simple, undemanding system for gathering information concerning
legislative rules from interested persons. Modern notice-andcomment rulemaking, in all its baroque glory, bears only a distant
37
resemblance to this original model. Very briefly, a few highlights of
the judicial rewrite include: drastically expanded obligations for
notices of proposed rulemaking; an extra-statutory duty to respond to
any comments a court deems material; “concise” explanations of rules
that are anything but concise; and an intrusive form of arbitrariness
review.
1. Notice. Section 553 of the APA provides that an agency
initiating legislative rulemaking must give notice of “either the terms
or substance of the proposed rule or a description of the subjects and
38
issues involved.” These days, the idea that an agency would try to
get away with a notice that merely offers a “description of the
subjects and issues involved” borders on the comical. Courts have
long insisted that agencies publish in their notices all of the technical
and scientific information upon which they relied in forming their
39
proposed rules.
2. Comments and the Concise General Statement of Basis and
Purpose. Section 553 instructs agencies to give “interested persons an
opportunity to participate in rule making through submission of
written data, views, or arguments with or without opportunity for oral
40
presentation.” The APA does not tell agencies what to do with these
41
comments other than to consider “relevant matter presented.”
When issuing rules, agencies must incorporate a “concise general
42
statement of their basis and purpose.”

37. For more details on this transformation, see generally Pierce, supra note 9.
38. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3) (2012).
39. See, e.g., United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 251 (2d Cir.
1977); see also Pierce, supra note 9, at 13 (detailing judicial transformation of the notice
requirement for notice-and-comment rulemaking).
40. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c).
41. Id.
42. Id.
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The “concise” part of this requirement is another bit of comedy.
Agency explanations for their rules are famously long, detailed, and
43
complex. One of the main reasons why agencies ignore this APA
requirement is that courts require these explanations to include a
response to any “significant” comment—and courts have the final call
44
on what is significant.
3. Arbitrariness review. Under § 706(2), the factual and policy
determinations underlying rules promulgated through notice-andcomment are subject to arbitrariness review. At the time of the
APA’s adoption, arbitrariness review was understood to be extremely
45
lax. For example, in Pacific States Box & Basket Co. v. White, the
Supreme Court declared that a rule should survive review for
arbitrariness under the Due Process Clause so long as “any state of
46
facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it.” Modern
arbitrariness review, by contrast, insists that an agency’s
contemporaneous explanation for a rule (i.e., its not-so-concise
general statement) demonstrate to a reviewing court’s satisfaction
that the agency based its action on consideration of relevant factors
47
and avoided any clear error of judgment. Not to put too fine a point
on it, this is a lot harder than it sounds.
The upshot of this judicial rewrite is that notice-and-comment
rulemaking is no longer a simple effort to take reasonable steps to
ensure that interested persons have a chance to share information
48
they deem pertinent with an agency. “Informal” rulemaking has
43. See Richard Parker, The Empirical Roots of the “Regulatory Reform” Movement: A
Critical Appraisal, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 359, 397 (2006) (observing that agencies offer “extremely
long explanations densely packed with technical detail and responsive to a host of comments but
targeted only at an insider audience” rather than the concise, general statement required by the
APA).
44. See, e.g., Portland Cement Ass’n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 394 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
(explaining agency obligation to respond to “significant” comments submitted during the
notice-and-comment process).
45. Pac. States Box & Basket Co. v. White, 296 U.S. 176 (1935).
46. Id. at 185 (quoting Borden’s Farm Prods. v. Baldwin, 293 U.S. 194, 209 (1934)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
47. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463
U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (quoting Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S.
281, 285 (1974)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (providing the modern, canonical
description of arbitrariness review of policy decisions); see also Stephen R. Johnson, Reasoned
Explanation and IRS Adjudication, 63 DUKE L.J. 1771, 1783–86 (2014) (providing more details
on the evolution of arbitrariness review).
48. Pierce, supra note 9, at 12 (observing that the “judicial version of APA section 553
bears no relationship to the requirements imposed by statute”).
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been formalized into a type of on-the-record proceeding that is highly
complex and burdensome. Due in large part to this judicially driven
transformation, ending the notice-and-comment gap—unlike Mayo’s
49
fix of the Chevron gap—could prove very expensive.
B. It Is Not Easy to Tell Interpretative from Legislative Rules
Resolving the notice-and-comment gap turns on one of the most
lasting and tricky problems presented by the APA—drawing the line
between interpretative rules (which do not require notice-andcomment procedures), and legislative rules (which generally do
require them). Reflecting this difficulty, the D.C. Circuit has said on
more than one occasion that these distinctions are “enshrouded in
50
considerable smog.” Although a full exploration of this problem is
far beyond the scope of this short essay, a few details follow.
One of the most influential efforts to pierce through the smog
came in American Mining Congress v. Mine Safety & Health
51
Administration, authored by Judge Williams, a former professor of
administrative law. He noted that the court’s inquiry had generally
52
hinged on whether a rule had the force of law. An agency rule will
carry the force of law so long as Congress has delegated legislative
53
rulemaking authority to the agency, and the agency has invoked it.
Judge Williams identified several ways to determine if an agency has
invoked legislative rulemaking authority. The easiest case is where an
agency expressly states that it has done so. In addition, a rule is
legislative where “in the absence of the rule there would not be an
adequate legislative basis for enforcement action or other agency
54
action to confer benefits or ensure the performance of duties.” This
type of situation exists where, for example, a statute imposes no
obligations on a regulated party other than to obey such rules as the
Secretary might promulgate: without the rules, there is nothing to
enforce, so the rules must be legislative. Also, a rule must be

49. See id. at 15 (describing potentially “devastating” costs of imposing full-blown noticeand-comment procedures on Treasury’s general authority regulations). But cf. id. at 20–23
(suggesting a potential means to mitigate these costs).
50. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 742 F.2d 1561, 1565 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc)
(quoting Am. Bus. Ass’n v. United States, 627 F.2d 525, 529 (D.C. Cir. 1980)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
51. Am. Mining Cong. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
52. Id. at 1109.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 1112.
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legislative if it “effectively amends a prior legislative rule,” because
55
the two are irreconcilable. At bottom, the American Mining
Congress approach thus asks whether a rule makes new law or, in a
variation on this same theme, changes old law. Applying this
approach in a given case can remain, of course, very difficult.
Another influential line of analysis approaches the problem from
the opposite direction, inquiring whether a rule can be fairly said to
56
interpret another statute or rule. This approach is naturally
problematic insofar as the line between interpreting law and creating
law is fuzzy. One guide that appears in the cases is that glosses on
extremely vague language (e.g., the term “reasonable”) tend to be
57
legislative. Another guide is that an agency may find difficulty
interpreting its way from general, qualitative language to precise,
58
quantitative rules.
Another approach, which Professor Hickman favors, focuses on
whether a rule binds both the promulgating agency and regulated
59
parties, and also imposes penalties for noncompliance. Professor
Hickman has concluded, quite broadly, that “all Treasury regulations
are legislative rules—whether they were promulgated under specific
authority or I.R.C. § 7805(a) general authority—for the simple reason
that they are legally binding on taxpayers and the government
60
alike.” On this view, absent application of some other exception,
these rules require notice-and-comment procedures.

55. Id.
56. See, e.g., Air Transp. Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. FAA, 291 F.3d 49, 55–56 (D.C. Cir. 2002)
(explaining that one factor determining whether a rule is interpretative is whether it spells out a
“duty fairly encompassed within the regulation that the interpretation purports to construe”
(quoting Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena LP, 117 F.3d 579, 588 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 117 F.3d at 588 (“The
distinction between an interpretative and substantive rule more likely turns on how tightly the
agency’s interpretation is drawn linguistically from the actual language of the statute or rule.”).
57. See United Techs. Corp. v. EPA, 821 F.2d 714, 719–20 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (“If, however,
the rule is based on an agency’s power to exercise its judgment as to how best to implement a
general statutory mandate, the rule is likely a legislative one.”).
58. See Hoctor v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 82 F.3d 165, 170 (7th Cir. 1996) (concluding that
requirement of an eight-foot fence could not be fairly characterized as an interpretation of
general duty of secure containment).
59. See Hickman, supra note 4, at 529; see generally Thomas Merrill & Kathryn Tongue
Watts, Agency Rules with the Force of Law: The Original Convention, 116 HARV. L. REV. 467
(2002).
60. See Hickman, supra note 5, at 1773.

MURPHY IN PP 2 (DO NOT DELETE)

34

DUKE LAW JOURNAL ONLINE

10/23/2014 5:17 PM

[Vol. 64:21

C. Due (and Pragmatic) Regard to History
Invoking “smoggy” doctrine to end the notice-and-comment gap
could require a major and costly change in Treasury’s rulemaking
procedures, in large part due to the courts’ creative rewrite of the
APA. If these points have any merit, perhaps they counsel that courts
should, if confronted with this problem, devote a bit of their judicial
creativity to characterizing Treasury’s general authority rules, or at
least many of them, as interpretative—even if this requires some
fumbling through the smog.
This general approach would be consonant with a long judicial
tradition that accords great weight to longstanding administrative
statutory constructions and practices, counseling that they should not
61
be “overturned except for cogent reasons.” As Professor Bryan T.
Camp’s contribution to this symposium explains, Treasury’s
categorization of its general authority rules as interpretative evolved
before the courts accepted that agencies could engage in subordinate
62
legislation. Under this conceptual framework, an agency rule could
not be legislative because it would then usurp legislative authority,
63
violating separation of powers. Even though Treasury could not
legislate, however, it nonetheless had to issue the rules necessary to
implement tax law sensibly. This circumstance naturally necessitated
a very generous understanding of the scope of the concept of an
interpretative rule.
One might think that adoption of the APA, with its ringing
endorsement of the existence of legislative rules, should have led
courts and commentators to revisit this issue. They might have
reasoned that, now that the law recognized agency power to impose
legislative rules, Treasury no longer needed speciously to characterize
rules that actually make law into an overly expansive “interpretative”

61. United States v. Chi., N. Shore & Milwaukee R.R. Co., 288 U.S. 1, 13 (1933); see also
supra note 15 and accompanying text.
62. See Bryan T. Camp, A History of Tax Regulation Prior to the Administrative Procedure
Act, 63 DUKE L.J. 1673, 1710 (2014) (explaining that tax regulations circa 1920 had to be
regarded as interpretative to be legitimate because, if they were legislative, they would
necessarily be “invalid exercises of power”).
63. See id. (stating that “[r]egulations that went beyond interpretations were invalid
exercises of power precisely because they were legislative in character”); see also Hickman,
supra note 5, at 1761–62 (observing that “[i]n the first part of the twentieth century, the general
consensus among courts and scholars held that a general authority grant that authorized legally
binding regulations would violate the nondelegation doctrine and thus be constitutionally
invalid”).
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pigeonhole, which could be suitably contracted. They did not,
however, seize this opportunity. The common view after adoption of
the APA, shared by Professor Kenneth Culp Davis, continued to be
64
that most Treasury regulations were interpretative. The persistence
of this view is, of course, itself strong evidence that rational minds can
accept a capacious understanding of interpretative rules.
Courts confronting the notice-and-comment gap will face a
choice. Following the path suggested by Mayo and advised by
Professor Hickman, they might aggressively apply “modern” and
“general” law to determine that Treasury’s general authority rules are
legislative and, thus, only legal if they were promulgated via noticeand-comment procedures. Alternatively, courts can give weight to
tax’s particular history and needs in order to justify a generous,
flexible approach to the category of interpretative rules. This Essay
suggests that courts take the latter stance, which is consistent with the
pragmatic, flexible approach that administrative law has often
followed in the past.
CONCLUSION
Treasury’s treatment of its general authority regulations as
interpretative has come under sustained and powerful scholarly fire
for violating generally applicable administrative law. This Essay does
not attempt to give a definitive response to this critique. Instead, it
merely suggests that courts, when they address this problem, adopt a
pragmatic and conservative attitude consistent with the better angels
of administrative law’s nature. The traditions of administrative law
leave room for a generous interpretation of the term “interpretative.”
Courts should consider that, unlike Mayo’s fix of the Chevron gap,
closing the notice-and-comment gap could prove extremely costly.
Given that the courts played a major role in creating these costs
through creative interpretation of the APA, one might even go so far
as to say that they owe Treasury a bit of interpretative generosity.

64.

Camp, supra note 62, at 1714.

